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seems desirable for the legislature to give to the probate court author-
ity to expunge from a will any libellous matter which is not strictly
dispositive. This solution, in accord with the time-proven English
practice, tends to preserve common law principles and at the same
time prevents injurious publication.
ROBERT A. Hovis.
Malicious Prosecution-Probable Cause as Question for Judge
or Jury-Authority of Agent to Institute Prosecution
Under Bad Check Law.
In the recent case of Dickerson v. Atlantic Refining Co.,' the
plaintiff gave an agent of the defendant company a check in payment
for certain goods. Three hours later, and before presentation of the
check to the drawee bank, the plaintiff was arrested on a warrant
sworn out by said agent charging him with uttering a worthless
check. Due to a subsequent deposit, the check was paid when pre-
sented by the general manager of the local branch of the defendant
corporation. The case against the plaintiff was ",nol. pros'd. with
leave," and this action for malicious prosecution was then instituted
against the defendant company and its agents. It was held that a
prosecution for uttering a worthless check, instituted chiefly to col-
lect a debt and before presentation, was prima facie evidence that
the prosecution was without probable cause, and that the evidence
was sufficient to take the case to the jury.
Although some of the earlier decisions are to the effect that prob-
able cause is a question to be determined by the jury,2 the more
numerous and later cases establish the principle that it is a question
of law to be determined by the court.3 The jury are to find the facts
1201 N. C. 90, 159 S. E. 446 (1931).
'Thurber v. Building and Loan Ass'n., 118 N. C. 129, 24 S. E. 730 (1896);
R. R. v. Hardware Co., 143 N. C. 54, 55 S. E. 422 (1906).
Overton v. Combs, 182 N. C. 4, 108 S. E. 357 (1921); Humphries v. Ed-
wards, 164 N. C. 154, 80 S. E. 165 (1914) (when the facts are admitted or
established, the question of probable cause is one of law) ; Bowen v. Pollard and
Co., 173 N. C. 129, 91 S. E. 711 (1921) (is a question of law to be decided by
the court upon the facts as they may be found by the jury) ; Tyler v. Mahoney,
166 N. C. 509, 82 S. E. 870 (1917) (a mixed question of law and fact) ; see
Jones v. R. R., 125 N. C. 227, 229, 34 S. E. 398, 399 (1899).
Despite this fact many cases state that a criminal prosecution for the purpose
of collecting a debt is prima facie evidence of lack of probable cause. Mc-
Donald v. Schroeder, 214 Pa. 411. 63 At. 1024, 6 L. R. A. (N. s.) 701, 6 ANN.
CAs. 506 (1906) ; Wenger v. Philips, 195 Pa. 214, 45 Atl. 27, 78 Am. St. Rep.
810 (1900) (is not conclusive in establishing want of probable cause, but is
prima facie evidence).
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and the judge is to instruct them hypothetically as to the existence
or non-existence of probable cause under the different views that
might be taken of the evidence. A rule that certain facts establish a
prima facie case of probable cause and a rule that the court deter-
mines the question cannot, in logic or practice, both exist at the same
time. The former requires a permissive instruction ;4 the latter, a
mandatory one. The instant holding reversing a nonsuit with in-
structions to submit the question of probable cause to the jury is
therefore an effectual, though inarticulate, repudiation of the estab-
lished rule.5
Under our "Bad Check Law" was the defendant justified in hav-
ing the plaintiff arrested without having presented the check to the
bank for payment? No general rule can be laid down due to the
diversity in form of the statutes in the different states ;7 but the
majority holding under the more recent statutes seems to be that the
giving of a check does not of itself represent that the drawer has with
the drawee bank sufficient funds out of which it will be paid, but
simply that the check will be paid in the ordinary course of business.8
In construing the North Carolina statute, the Supreme Court seems
In Hotel Supply Co. v. Reid, 16 Ala. App. 563, 80 So. 137 (1918) it was
held an abuse of criminal process.
""Of course, a prima facie showing does not necessarily mean that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover. It is sufficient to carry the case to the jury, and
it is for the jurors to say whether or not the crucial and necessary facts have
been established. We express no opinion as to the weight of the evidence, other
than its prima facie character, which means only that it is legally sufficient to
carry the case to the jury and to warrant a recovery, nothing else appearing.
It neither insures nor compels a recovery, however." Dickerson v. Refining
Co., 201 N. C. 90, 96, 159 S. E. 446, 450 (1931).
'Of course, the ruling of nonsuit might have been reversed on the ground
that the plaintiff's evidence, taken as true under the motion for nonsuit, showed
want of probable cause as a matter of law. That is, it might be established as
a rule of substantive law that a prosecution under the "Bad Check Law" insti-
tuted either before presentation or for a collateral purpose, and not to vindicate
public justice, is want of probable cause as a matter of law. But the theory of
reversal here is solely that the case should have gone to the jury.
'N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §4283(a). It shall be unlawful for any
person ... to draw, make, utter or issue and deliver to another, any check or
draft ... knowing at the time of making, drawing, uttering, issuing, and de-
livering . . .that the maker or drawer thereof has not sufficient funds on
deposit in or credit with the bank ... with which to pay the same upon
presentation.
' Note (1925) 35 A. L. R. 344, and Note (1925) 35 A. L. R. 380.
'Maxey v. State, 85 Ark. 499, 108 S. W. 1135 (1908) ; Arrington v. State,
296 S. W. 568, Tex. Cr. App. (1927), in which the defendant was held not
guilty of uttering a worthless check, although he had given a check knowing
that he did not have sufficient funds on deposit with which to pay the same.
Before the check could have been presented he paid a part and promised pay-
ment of the balance. See (1927) 14 VA. L. REv. 134.
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to indicate that presentation of the check to the drawee bank is nec-
essary before the drawer can be convicted under the act.9 The statute
makes no reference to posL-dated checks; but it has been held that a
post-datdd check is not a representation that the drawer has funds for
payment upon presentation, and the maker is not guilty of uttering
a worthless check.10 Even though it were ascertained by the payee
that the maker of the check did not have sufficient funds on deposit
at the time of the drawing, there should be a presentation of the
check to the drawee bank, before criminal proceedings are instituted
by the payee, to avoid liability for malicious prosecution or false
arrest. 1
When an agent is acting within the scope of his employment, a
prosecution undertaken for the purpose of furthering the master's
business would, if unfounded, impose liability upon the master. 12 As
a general rule it appears that general managers and agents employed
for collection purposes are acting within their authority when insti-
tuting proceedings against anyone uttering a worthless check payable
to the master.' 3 If such prosecution is instituted without probable
cause, for the purpose of collecting a debt due the employer, then the
'Stacy, C. J., in State v. Crawford, 198 N. C. 522, 152 S. E. 504 (1930),
states that "our statute is specifically directed against the issuance of checks or
drafts on any bank or depository when the maker or drawer thereof has not
sufficient funds on deposit in or credit with such bank or depository with which
to pay the same upon presentation."
In State v. Yarboro, 194 N. C. 498, 140 S. E. 216 (1927), our court passed
on the constitutionality of and construed the statute. Note (1927) 6 N. C. L.
REv. 300.
"0 State v. Crawford, supra note 5. Contra: State v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588,
207 Pac. 838 (1922) ; State v. Johnson, 116 Kan. 390, 226 Pac. 758 (1924);
People v. Westerdahl, 316 Ill. 86, 146 N. E. 737 (1925).
Statutes against obtaining property by false pretenses do not include post-
dated checks. State v. Ferris, 171 Ind. 562, 86 N. E. 993 (1909) ; (1928) 34
W. VA. L. Q. 207.
'If the prosecution is instituted before presentation of the check it should
be lack of probable cause and evidence of malice, if the check is paid when
presented. This was in effect held in Dickerson v. Atl. Ref. Co., supra note 1;
supra note 5.
If there is an agreement to hold a check and then a criminal prosecution is
instituted, it is evidence of malice, and also of lack of probable cause. Aldana
v. Tarazon, 15 S. W. (2d) 678, (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) ; Turner v. Brenner, 138
Va. 232, 121 S. E. 510 (1924).
=Jackson v. Amer. Tel. and Telegrdph Co., 139 N. C. 347, 51 S. E. 1015, 70
L. R. A. 738 (1905) ; Kelly v. Shoe Co., 190 N. C. 406, 130 S. E. 32 (1925) ;
(but if the agent exceeds his authority the master is not liable) Buttery v.
Wilhite, 208 Ala. 573, 94 So. 585 (1922).
, Sweatman v. Linton, 66 Utah 208, 241 Pac. 309 (1925); Hostettler v.
Carter, 73 Okla. 125, 175 Pac. 244 (1918); Gorman-Gammill Seed and Dairy
Co. v. Morton, 203 Ala. 530, 84 So. 766 (1919).
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principal may be liable for malicious prosecution or false arrest.1 4
It was recently held that if an agent is expressly forbidden to accept
checks except at his own risk, and he then procures the arrest of a
person for cashing a worthless check, the employer is not responsible,
unless there is a subsequent ratification of the act of the agent.1 5
To avoid liability for a malicious prosecution the owner of a busi-
ness enterprise should forbid its agents to institute proceedings under
the Worthless Check Act, until the check has been presented and
returned from the bank ;16 or else, to vindicate public justice and not
merely to collect a debt, make a full and fair disclosure of the facts
to a reliable attorney before commencing the prosecution ;17 or so
limit the authority of the agent that he will be acting outside the
scope of his employment if he institutes criminal proceedings t6 en-
force payment of a check.'
8
A. T. ALLEN, JR.
* Hotel Supply Co. v. Reid, supra note 3; Hostettler v. Carter; Sweatman
v. Linton, both upra note 13.
If there is probable cause for the arrest, and no evidence of malice on the
part of the agent, the master is not liable. Genovesse v. Piggly Wiggly, 32
S. W. (2d) 379, Tex. Civ. App. (1930).
' Lamm v. Charles Stores Co., 201 N. C. 134, 159 S. E. 444 (1931), in which
the store manager's arrest of the plaintiff on a charge of cashing a worthless
check was held to be an unauthorized act. There were written instructions to
the store manager in the following words: "If a manager cashes a personal
check, it is his own responsibility and he will positively be -held responsible."
There was no evidence of ratification of the act of the agent and the master
was not held liable for the false imprisonment.
Counsel in this case seems to have overlooked the rule of Price v. Neal, that
the loss on the forged check should have been borne by the drawee bank. Bank
v. Trust Co., 168 N. C. 605, 85 S. E. 5, L. R. A. 1915 D 1138 (1915).
Whether the agent had authority to take checks was not decided, but the fact
that the store, manager did take checks and that this was known by the em-
ployer, would seem to imply such authority. Even though the manager was
acting within the scope of his employment in accepting checks in payment would
not necessarily imply that he had the further authority to prosecute, since he
accepted the checks at his own risk, and there could be no benefit to the prin-
cipal. Whereas, in Dickerson v. Refining Co., supra note 1, the agents insti-
tuted the proceedings to collect a debt due the principal, and whether they were
within the scope of their authority, or whether there was a ratification of their
act, was held for the jury to determine. You must look to the facts in each
particular case. There was such a difference in the facts to the two cases as to
justify the different conclusions reached.
"s Dickerson v. Atl. Refining Co., supra note 1.
' The advice of counsel, given in good faith on a full and fair statement of
all the facts, is a defense in an action for malicious prosecution. Moser v.
Fable, 164 Ky. 517, 175 S. W. 997 (1915) ; J. B. Colt Co. v. Grubbs, 206 Ky.
809, 268 S. W. 817 (1925) ; Downing v. Stone, 152 N. C. 525, 68 S. E. 9, 136
Am. St. Rep. 841, 21 ANN. CAs. 753 (1910) (not a complete defense, but
evidence to be submitted to the jury on the issue of probable cause as well as
the issue of malice).
'Lamm v. Charles Stores Co., supra note 15.
